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We show that the three-intensity protocol for measurement device independent quantum key
distribution (MDI QKD) can be done with different light intensities in only one basis. Given the
fact that the exact values yields of single-photon pairs in the X and Z bases must be the same, if
we have lower bound of the value in one basis, we can also use this as the lower bound in another
basis. Since in the existing set-up for MDI-QKD, the yield of sources in different bases are normally
different, therefore our method can improve the key rate drastically if we choose to only use the
lower bound of yield of single-photon pairs in the advantageous basis. Moreover, since our proposal
here uses fewer intensities of light, the probability of intensity mismatch will be smaller than the
existing protocols do. This will further improve the advantage of our method. The advantage of
using Z basis or X basis of our method is studied and significant improvement of key rates are
numerically demonstrated.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 42.81.Gs, 03.67.Hk
Device imperfection can cause serious problem in se-
curity of quantum key distribution (QKD) [1, 2]. The
major imperfection include the multi-photon events of
source and the limited signal detection rate of. The de-
coy state method [3–12] can help to make a set-up with
an imperfect single photon source be as secure as that
with a perfect single photon source [13, 14].
Besides the source imperfection, the limited detection
rate is another big threaten to the security [15]. The-
ories of the device independent security proof [16] have
been proposed to overcome the problem. However, these
theories are technical demanding.
Recently, measurement device independent QKD
(MDI-QKD) was proposed based on the idea of entangle-
ment swapping [17, 18]. If we want to obtain a higher key
rate, we can choose to directly use an imperfect single-
photon source such as the coherent state [18] with decoy-
state method for this, say the MDI decoy-state method.
Calculation formulas for the practical decoy-state imple-
mentation with only a few different states has been stud-
ied in, e.g., Refs. [19, 20].
In the initial proposal[18], it is assumed to use differ-
ent intensities calculate the lower bound values (sZ
11
, sX
11
)
for yields of single-photon pairs in Z basis and X basis
separately. Here in this work, based on the fact that the
yields sX
11
and sZ
11
of single-photon pairs in the X and Z
bases are equal, we propose to use differen intensities in
one basis only. Since sZ
11
= sX
11
, the lower bound of one
of them must be also the lower bound of another one.
Given the experimental data in the normal case (linear
loss for channel), the calculated lower bound values for
sX
11
and sZ
11
can be significantly different, but we can sim-
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ply choose to use the bigger one. Therefore, we only need
to use different intensities in the basis that produce data
for a larger lower bound value of yield of single-photon
pair. For example, we choose to use vacuum, two differ-
ent intensities in Z basis, and only one (weak) intensity
in X basis. As we shall show, both methods can im-
prove the key rate. As shown below, given the same
intensities, normally the experimental data would cause
the fact that sZ
11
> sX
11
. We use different intensities in
Z basis and simply use sZ
11
for sX
11
, whenever we need
sX
11
n the all calculations. The differen intensities in Z
basis can be chosen based on the optimization of the fi-
nal key. We only need one weak intensity in X basis
in order to estimate the upper bound of phase-flip rate
of detected events by single-photon pairs. On the other
hand, since the observed bit-flip rate in X basis is very
large, the data from X basis cannot be distilled into final
key. We can also choose to use different weak intensities
to find sX
11
, and then use this as the fixed value for yield
of single-photon pairs in both bases. In this method, we
can choose one intensity in Z basis to optimize the key
rate.
For clarity, lets recall the decoy-state MDI-QKD and
denote some mathematical notations first. In the proto-
col, we assume Alice (Bob) has three sources, oA, xA, yA
(oB, xB , yB) which can only emit three different states
ρoA = |0〉〈0|, ρxA , ρyA (ρoB = |0〉〈0|, ρxB , ρyB ), re-
spectively, in photon number space. Suppose ρxA =∑
k ak|k〉〈k|, ρyA =
∑
k a
′
k|k〉〈k|, ρxB =
∑
k bk|k〉〈k|,
ρyB =
∑
k b
′
k|k〉〈k|,
In the protocol, each time a pulse-pair (two-pulse
state) is sent to the relay for detection. The relay is
controlled by an UTP. The UTP will announce whether
the pulse-pair has caused a successful event. Those bits
corresponding to successful events will be post-selected
2and further processed for the final key. Since real set-
ups only use imperfect single-photon sources, we need
the decoy-state method for security.
We assume Alice (Bob) has three sources, oA, xA, yA
(oB , xB, yB) which can only emit three different states
ρoA = |0〉〈0|, ρxA , ρyA (ρoB = |0〉〈0|, ρxB , ρyB ), respec-
tively, in photon number space. Suppose
ρxA =
∑
k
ak|k〉〈k|, ρyA =
∑
k
a′k|k〉〈k|; (1)
ρxB =
∑
k
bk|k〉〈k|, ρyB =
∑
k
b′k|k〉〈k|, (2)
and we request the states satisfy the following very im-
portant condition:
a′k
ak
≥
a′
2
a2
≥
a′
1
a1
;
b′k
bk
≥
b′
2
b2
≥
b′
1
b1
, (3)
for k ≥ 2. The explicit formula for lower bound of
s11 with 3 different intensities of light was first given
in Ref.[20]. Very recently, a tighter bound was pro-
posed [22]. Here we use the formula in Ref.[22] for the
lower bound value of single-photon pairs in ω basis, i.e.
sω
11
, (ω = X,Z) and the upper bound of the error rate
eω
11
, (ω = X,Z) with the following formulas
sω
11
≥ sω
11
=
(a1a
′
2
b1b
′
2
− a′
1
a2b
′
1
b2)S˜
ω
xx − b1b2(a1a
′
2
− a′
1
a2)S˜
ω
xy − a1a2(b1b
′
2
− b′
1
b2)S˜
ω
yx
a1b1(a1a′2 − a
′
1
a2)(b1b′2 − b
′
1
b2)
, (4)
and
eω
11
≤ eω
11
=
T˜ωxx
a1b1sω11
, (5)
where S˜ωxx = S
ω
xx− a0S
ω
0x− b0S
ω
x0+ a0b0S00, S˜
ω
xy = S
ω
xy −
a0S
ω
0y − b
′
0
Sωx0 + a0b
′
0
S00, S˜
ω
yx = S
ω
yx − a
′
0
Sω
0x − b0S
ω
y0 +
a′
0
b0S00, S˜
ω
yy = S
ω
yy − a
′
0
Sω
0y − b
′
0
Sωy0 + a
′
0
b′
0
S00 and T˜
ω
xx =
Tωxx − a0T
ω
0x − b0T
ω
x0 + a0b0T00, with S
ω
αβ , T
ω
αβ are the
probabilities of a bit or a wrong bit is produced whenever
the source αAβB is used in ω basis. We also have the
relationship Tαβ = SαβEαβ .
Consider those post-selected bits cased by source xAxB
in the Z basis. After an error test, we know the bit-
flip error rate of this set, say TZxx = E
Z
xxS
Z
xx. We also
need the phase-flip rate for the subset of bits which are
caused by the two single-photon pulse, say eph
11
, which is
asymptotically equal to the flip rate of post-selected bits
caused by a single photon in the X basis, say eX
11
. Given
this, we can now calculate the key rate. For example, for
those post-selected bits caused by source yy, it is[18]
R = a′
1
b′
1
sZ
11
[1−H(eX
11
)]− fSZyyH(E
Z
yy), (6)
where f is the efficiency factor of the error correction
method used.
As shown in [20], the exact values of yields of single-
photon pairs must be equal in different bases. Suppose
that at each side, horizontal and vertical polarizations
have equal probability to be chosen. For all those single-
photon pairs in the Z basis, the state in polarization
space is
1
4
(
ΩHH
11
+ΩV V
11
+ΩHV
11
+ΩV H
11
)
=
1
4
I, (7)
where ΩPQ
11
= |P 〉〈P | ⊗ |Q〉〈Q|,P,Q indicate the polar-
ization which can be either H or V . On the other hand,
for all those two single-photon pulse pairs prepared in
the X basis, if the pi/4 and 3pi/4 polarizations are cho-
sen with equal probability, one can easily find that the
density matrix of these single-photon pairs is also I/4.
Therefore, we conclude
sZ
11
= sX
11
. (8)
If we implement the decoy-state method for different
bases separately, with the known values Sαβ , we can cal-
culate the values of sX
11
and sZ
11
by Eq.(4). Usually, these
two estimated values are not equal to each other. Actu-
ally, we can find out that sZ
11
≥ sX
11
in our simulations for
coherent-state source if we use same intensities in each
bases. Taking the fact that sX
11
= sZ
11
into consideration,
we can substitute sX
11
with sZ
11
and have a more tight
upper bound of eX
11
such that
eX
11,Z =
T˜ωxx
a1b1sZ11
≤ eX
11
, (9)
where sZ
11
is given in Eq.(4) and eX
11
is defined in Eq.(5).
Then we can use the following formula to calculate the
key rate
RZ = a
′
1
b′
1
sZ
11
[1−H(eX
11,Z)]− fS
Z
yyH(E
Z
yy), (10)
where sZ
11
is given in Eq.(4) and eX
11,Z is defined in Eq.(9).
With Eq.(10), we only need the weaker decoy-state pulse
in X basis. That is to say, in this situation, Alice and
Bob only need sources xA and xB in X basis. Given
the intensities of sources xA, xB in X and Z bases, we
can optimize the intensity of sources yA, yB in Z basis by
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FIG. 1: (Color online) The optimaized relative key rate versus
the total channel transmission loss using 3-intensity decoy
state MDI-QKD. Values are the ratio of key rate to the key
rate using infinite intensities.
maximizing the key rate RZ . In Eq.(10), s
Z
11
, eX
11,Z and
SZyyH(E
Z
yy) are all dependent on the intensity. There is a
balance between sZ
11
and SyAyB . These restrictions make
the key rate value being limited: a bigger intensity will
produce a larger Syy, but will also lead to a smaller s
Z
11
.
can not be increased remarkably. Given this fact, we can
also consider to replace sZ
11
by sX
11
to get another formula
to calculate the key rate
RX = a
′
1
b′
1
sX
11
[1−H(eX
11
)]− fSZyyH(E
Z
yy), (11)
where sZ
11
is given in Eq.(4) and eX
11
is defined in Eq.(5).
If we want to use this formula, we need different inten-
sities in X basis to figure out sX
11
, while only need one
intensity (signal pulse) in Z basis. Since the pulses in X
basis cannot be used to generate the final key, here we
can choose smaller values of intensities so as to produce
a bigger value of sX
11
. We shall also regard this as the
lower bound for sZ
11
. Now that the lower bound of sZ
11
is
determined by the light in X basis already, in optimizing
the key rate, we only need to choose an optimal inten-
sity for source yA, yB so that S
Z
yy is maximized. Note
that here in choosing the optimum intensity in Z basis,
there is no balance between SZyy and s
Z
11
, as the latter
one has been determined by pulses in X basis already,
therefore we only need to optimize SZyy. This gives us
larger freedom in choosing the intensity and hence offers
more chances for a higher key rate.
Now, we present some numerical simulations to com-
paring our results with the existing results [21, 22]. Be-
low for simplicity, we suppose that Alice and Bob use the
coherent-state sources. Here, we denote Alice’s sources
{0A, xA, yA} by their intensities {µ0, µ1, µ2} and Bob’s
sources {0B, xB , yB} by their intensities {ν0, ν1, ν2} re-
spectively. The UTP locates in the middle of Alice and
Bob, and the UTP’s detectors are identical, i.e., they
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FIG. 2: (Color online) The optimal intensities versus the total
channel transmission loss using 3-intensity decoy state MDI-
QKD.
TABLE I: List of experimental parameters used in numeri-
cal simulations: e0 is the error rate of background, ed is the
misalignment-error probability; pd is the dark count rate per
detector; f is the error correction inefficiency.
e0 ed pd f
0.5 1.5% 3.0 × 10−6 1.16
have the same dark count rate and detection efficiency,
and their detection efficiency does not depend on the in-
coming signals. We shall estimate what values would be
probably observed for the gains and error rates in the
normal cases by the linear models as in [18, 21]:
|n〉〈n| =
n∑
k=0
Cknξ
k(1− ξ)n−k|k〉〈k|
where ξk is the transmittance for a distance from Al-
ice to the UTB. For fair comparison, we use the same
parameter values used in [18, 21] for our numerical eval-
uation, which follow the experiment reported in [23]. For
simplicity, we shall put the detection efficiency to the
overall transmittance η = ξ2ζ. We assume all detectors
have the same detection efficiency ζ and dark count rate
pd. The values of these parameters are presented in Ta-
ble I. With this, the total gains Sωµi,νj , (ω = X,Z) and
error rates Sωµi,νjE
ω
µi,νj
, (ω = X,Z) of Alice’s intensity
µi(i = 0, 1, 2) and Bob’s intensity νj(j = 0, 1, 2) can be
calculated. By using these values, we can estimate the
key rate with Eq.(6), Eq.(10) and Eq.(11) in Fig.6, which
shows that our methods are more tightly than the pre-
existed result. In order to see more clearly, in Fig.1, we
plot the relative value of the key rate to the result ob-
tained with the infinite decoy-state method. We can ob-
serve that our results are closer to the asymptotic limit
4of the infinite decoy-state method than the pre-existed
results. Note that, in the actual case, the advantage of
our method will be even larger than presented in the fig-
ure. In the actual case, the total number of pulses is
finite. In our protocol, we use fewer intensities than the
existing one does. Therefore the the probability of inten-
sity mismatch becomes smaller. In these figures, the blue
dotted line is obtained by Eq.(6), the green dash-dot line
is obtained by Eq.(10), the red dashed line is obtained by
Eq.(11), and the black solid line is obtained by the infi-
nite decoy-state method. In the simulation, the densities
used by Alice and Bob are assigned to µ1 = ν1 = 0.1,
µ2 = ν2 = 0.15. The optimal densities with maximizing
the key rate versus the total channel transmission loss is
given in Fig.2 with the blue dotted line, the green dash-
dot line and the red dashed line corresponding to the key
rate given by Eq.(6), Eq.(11), and Eq.(10) respectively.
In summary, we have shown that the decoy-state MDI
QKD can be done with different intensities in only one
basis. Our method has the a number of advantages: We
use fewer intensities and this may simplify the implemen-
tation; also our method reduces the probability of inten-
sity mismatch, this will definitely improve the key rate.
Even we don’t consider the factor of intensity mismatch
and only consider the key rate from those signal pulses,
our method can still offer a higher key rate because we
can choose to use the bigger value between sZ
11
, sX
11
.
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